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Many of the 179 active federal appeals court judgeships authorized by
Congress have remained vacant for protracted times. Over the last
dozen years, the appellate system has experienced numerous openings,
which have generally comprised ten percent of those seats. Particular
tribunals' situations have been worse. At various times since 1996, the
United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fourth, and Ninth
Circuits operated without a third of their judges. However, the most
egregious and recent illustration is the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit. Almost half of that court's positions are now
empty, while a number of its seats have been unfilled for extensive
periods.
Judicial appointments to the Sixth Circuit have proven highly
controversial, eliciting accusations and countercharges among Senate
members who represent states located in that circuit. For example,
Senator Spencer Abraham (R-MI) prevented Senate Judiciary Committee
hearings for years on two Michigan women whom President Bill Clinton
nominated. This delay required that Judge Helene White wait longer
than any person in American history without receiving Senate
consideration. Michigan Democratic Senators Carl Levin and Debbie
Stabenow responded to the delay first by requesting hearings on the
Clinton nominees or the creation of a bipartisan judicial selection
commission. When President George W. Bush rebuffed these overtures
by submitting four Michigan nominees, Levin and Stabenow then
blocked their Senate consideration. Democrats in the upper chamber
also apparently found both Ohioans whom the chief executive proposed
on May 9, 2001 so conservative that the Judiciary Committee in the 107th
Congress accorded neither individual a hearing.
Political phenomena substantially explain these machinations. For
instance, the court's active judges comprise similar numbers of
Republican and Democratic appointees, who frequently split along party
lines when addressing disputed public policy issues, such as abortion
and religious freedom. Moreover, Grand Old Party (GOP) politicians
may well view the tribunal's vacancies as an opportunity to have
Republican.presidents name a majority of its members. The propositions
in this paragraph received public expression in the opinions resolving
the University of Michigan affirmative action case, Grutter v. Bollinger,
which included stinging allegations of procedural manipulation to
1
influence the substantive result and equally vociferous denials.

' Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 617 (2002).
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Six of the Sixth Circuit's sixteen positions are currently open. The
Judicial Conference, the federal courts' policymaking arm, has suggested
that Congress approve two new seats for the tribunal. Empirical data on
dockets and workloads substantiate these recommendations. Chief
Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr. has correspondingly asserted to the Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts
that the Sixth Circuit caseload warrants additional positions.
Nonetheless, Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA), the subcommittee's thenchair, authored a 1999 report which contended that the appeals court
functions well using its present judicial complement.
However, there is evidence that the tribunal performs less
efficaciously than some of the twelve regional circuits. For example,
most appellate courts provide greater percentages of published opinions
than does the Sixth Circuit. Moreover, no tribunal relies so heavily on
visiting judges to constitute panels. The Sixth Circuit also decides
appeals more slowly than any other appellate court except the one with
the largest docket. Sixth Circuit vacancies have even necessitated
cancellation of oral arguments, which imposes unnecessary expense and
delay on the tribunal, judges, counsel, and parties.
All of the above ideas suggest that federal judicial appointments to the
Sixth Circuit have grown increasingly controversial and deserve
analysis, which this essay undertakes. Part One explores the origins and
development of the problems that have accompanied Sixth Circuit
judicial selection. Part Two evaluates numerous potential remedies for
the difficulties affecting appointments which the first segment identifies.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. Introduction

The historical background of the complications in Sixth Circuit federal
judicial selection seems to require somewhat limited assessment here
because the existing circumstances appear most important.
Nevertheless, considerable examination is appropriate, as it can improve
understanding of the Sixth Circuit and of the problems related to its
appointments. Moreover, analyzing only the background which directly
involves the Sixth Circuit may seem most relevant.
However,
developments in this court cannot be separated from those elsewhere, so
that evaluating national phenomena helps clarify the Sixth Circuit's
situation. For instance, the ongoing Michigan dispute resembles one
which is continuing in North Carolina.
Four North Carolinians
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nominated by Clinton never received Judiciary Committee hearings.
Moreover, North Carolina's Democratic senator has precluded
consideration of a Bush appeals court nominee from North Carolina.
The Second, Fourth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits have had many vacancies
at different times since the mid-1990s. Republican Senate members also
might have considered several Clinton designees for the Ninth Circuit
too liberal just as Democratic senators could find some Bush nominees
for the Fourth and Sixth Circuits overly conservative. Therefore, the
Sixth Circuit may not be typical, but attempts to appoint judges for the
tribunal have encountered difficulties that resemble those in other
courts.

B. National Developments
National developments implicating Sixth Circuit judicial selection are
subtle and complex. It might appear that these developments need
relatively little treatment here because they have received rather
2
comprehensive analysis elsewhere.
Nonetheless, comparatively
thorough assessment can enhance understanding. The national problem
involving appointments has two major components. The first is the
persistent vacancies dilemma, which resulted from Congress'
enlargement of federal court jurisdiction and the dramatic increase in
appeals over the last few decades. This situation promoted the appellate
bench's growth, which increased the number and frequency of empty
seats and frustrated efforts to fill them. The second is the present
dilemma. Its principal sources are political and derive substantially from
control of the White House and the Senate by opposing political parties
since the late 1980s. I emphasize this concept, particularly the feature's
political dimension, because those notions better explain the difficulties
that have beset Sixth Circuit selection. However, the permanent
complication warrants some consideration.
This analysis should
improve understanding, particularly of the historical developments
3
which contributed to the current problem.

2
See, e.g., MILLER CENTER COMMISSION NUMBER 7, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
SELECTION OF FEDERAL JUDGES (1996) [hereinafter MILLER REPORT); Gordon Berrnant et al.,
Judicial Vacancies: An Examination of the Problem and Possible Solutions, 14 MISS. COL. L. REV.
319 (1994). I rely in this essay on Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection in a Time of Divided
Government, 47 EMORY L.J. 527 (1998). Many ideas in that article remain relevant.
' It warrants less because much delay is inherent and, thus, defies treatment; political
factors underlie less the persistent dilemma than the current problem; and it has been
assessed elsewhere. See, e.g., Berrnant et al., supra note 2 (examining problem of judicial
vacancies); The Committee on Federal Courts, Remedying the Permanent Vacancy Problem in
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l. The Persistent Vacancies Problem

The persistent dilemma comprises multiple constituents, certain of
which can be traced to this country's origins and Article II of the United
States Constitution. Nevertheless, I emphasize the dilemma's modern
aspects, whose primary causes have been expanded federal court
jurisdiction and mounting appeals.
These phenomena have led
Congress to authorize many new positions, thus increasing the number
and frequency of vacancies as well as the difficulty of confirming judges.
a. The Early History
Article II's appointments clause provides that the President "shall
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
4
appoint" judges. Founders envisioned that the Senate would serve as
an effective check on the chief executive's potential for favoritism and
would restrict the president's possible choice of unfit individuals while
5
affording considerable stability. The Framers explicitly recognized, and
consciously anticipated, that politics would be instrumental to judicial
appointments.
Senators have actively participated in selection since the nation was
founded, and they have a substantial stake in affecting, or appearing to
6
influence, the process. Complicated political accommodations between
the chamber and the chief executive during the system's early phases
7
have facilitated its operation. Moreover, senators have conventionally
helped identify nominees, especially for the federal district courts.

the Federal Judiciary -The Problem of Judicial Vacancies and Its Causes, 42 REC. Ass'N B. CITY
N.Y. 374 (1987) [hereinafter N.Y. City Bar) (proposing possible solutions to problem of
judicial vacancies); Victor Williams, Solutions to Federal Judicial Gridlock, 76 JUDICATURE 185
(1993) (discussing solutions to federal judicial gridlock).
4
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The Constitution accords the President and the
Senate much greater responsibility than the House and the judiciary. The President
includes Executive Branch officials, such as lawyers in the White House Counsel Office and
the Department of Justice, who help the President. The Senate includes the Judiciary
Committee, which has primary responsibility for the confirmation process, and its chair,
Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT); the Majority Leader, Senator William Frist (R-TN); and
individual Senate members.
' See The Federalist No. 76, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) O. E. Cooke ed., 1961); see also
MICHAEL GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 28 (2000); SHELDON GOLDMAN,
PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN
(1997); Albert P. Melone, The Senate's Confirmation Role in Supreme Court Nominations and the
Politics of Ideology Versus Impartiality, 75 JUDICATURE 68, 69 (1991).
6
See HAROLD w. CHASE, FEDERAL JUDGES, THE APPOINTING PROCESS 7 (1972).
' See Bermant et al., supra note 2, at 321; see also GERHARDT, supra note 5, at 29-34;
Melone, supra note 5.
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Senators, or senior elected officials of the president's political party, from
the state in which the judge will be stationed have normally
recommended candidates whom the chief executive has subsequently
8
nominated.
Politics, therefore, pervade appointments. If the president and
senators disagree, they may act strategically to gain benefit and to
control nomination and confirmation, even employing delay for tactical
9
Examples of these ideas include Senator Abraham's
purposes.
successful efforts in blocking Senate consideration of Clinton nominees
from Michigan and attempts by Senators Levin and Stabenow to prevent
10
Senate Judiciary Committee hearings for Bush's Michigan designees.
Tension between the chief executive and chamber members will persist,
11
as long as Senate advice and consent is required for confirmation.
In short, the president and senators have always shared responsibility
for selecting judges in a process that has been politicized since the
republic was created. However, significant numbers of openings, which
could remain vacant for an extended time, only became a potential
complication during the 1970s. Indeed, for almost 200 years after
Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789, the complement of appeals
and district court judgeships slowly increased to 300. The few empty
seats and their comparative infrequency meant that open positions were
12
easily filled, thus preventing the dilemma which ultimately arose.
b. History Since 1950
Federal court jurisdiction greatly expanded over the second half of the
13
twentieth century.
Congress federalized much criminal activity and
prescribed many new civil causes of actions, which prompted a 300
' President Dwight Eisenhower named few judges home-state senators opposed.
Lawrence E. Walsh, The Federal Judiciary - Progress and the Road Ahead, 43 J. AM.
JUDICATURE SOC'Y 155, 156 (1960); see also MILLER REPORT, supra note 2, at 4 (stating Robert
Kennedy's view as Senate appointment with president's advice and consent).
' See CHASE, supra note 6, at 14, 40; Bermant et al., supra note 2, at 321; see also Melone,
supra note 5.
10
See supra notes 1,5, infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
11
There are apparently two means for addressing that constitutional command. "One
requires constitutional interpretation, the other constitutional amendment." Bermant et al,
supra note 2, at 322.
12
See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 2, at 531; MILLER REPORT, supra note 2, at 3.
13
See MILLER REPORT, supra note 2, at 3; see also Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari and a
National Study of the Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1264, 1270 (1996) (noting
congressional passage of statutes that expanded federal jurisdiction). See generally Martha
Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts of Appeals, 1996
WIS. L. REV. 12.
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percent annual increase in district court filings since the 1960s.
Lawmakers responded to caseload growth by enlarging the number of
federal judges; therefore, Congress has now authorized 844 active
15
appellate and district court positions.
The Committee on Long Range Planning of the United States Judicial
Conference, in a comprehensive 1995 assessment of the federal courts'
future, predicted that docket increases would necessitate 2,300 active
16
judges by 2010 and 4,170 by 2020. Although expanding the judiciary
17
remains controversial, the bench will continue to grow, in part because
18
Congress will apparently not limit civil or criminal jurisdiction. The
Committee also ascertained that the period required to fill openings had
19
lengthened. From 1980 until 1995, nominations on average consumed a
year and confirmations three months, and the time for each component
20
increased.
A Federal Judicial Center (FJC) study determined that
vacancy rates between 1970 and 1992 almost doubled in the federal
districts and were more than twice as high in the appeals courts, while
21
most delay occurred from the time of an opening until nomination.
The persistent dilemma has imposed numerous disadvantages. For
example, vacancies have impeded the judiciary's efforts to decide cases
promptly, while they have placed unwarranted pressure on sitting
judges and posed difficulties for parties and attorneys who must

14
See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701-14223 (1995)); Americans With Disabilities
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)).
See generally William P. Marshall, Federalization: A Critical Overoiew, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 719
(1995) (discussing problems with expansion of federal power); MILLER REPORT, supra note
2, at 3 (reporting problem of judicial vacancies).
15
See 28 u.s.c. §§ 44, 133 (1994); see also VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2002),
available at http:IIwww.uscourts.gov I vacancies I judgevacancy.htm.
16
See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE
FEDERAL COURTS 16 (1995) (hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN]. The Long Range Planning
Committee predicted that 1,330 judgeships would be required by 2000; however, Congress
did not authorize those positions partly for political reasons.
" Compare Stephen Reinhardt, A Plea to Save the Federal Courts: Too Few fudges, Too
Many Cases, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52 with Gerald Bard Tjoflat, More fudges, Less Justice,
A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 70.
18
See MILLER REPORT, supra note 2, at 3. See generally William L. Reynolds & William
M. Richman, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand
Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273 (1996) (discussing changes in appellate courts to
accommodate growth in dockets).
19
See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 16, at 103.
1J)
See id. at 3-4.
21
See Bermant et al., supra note 2, at 323.
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22

compete for scarce court resources.
Moreover, in the 22 years after
1970, empty seats had a statistically significant impact on average
judicial workloads for appeals and district judges of nine and ten percent
23
respectively.
This exploration demonstrated that politics have long attended judicial
24
selection.
However, some observers of the process assert that
politicization has increased since the 1960s, beginning in the
administration of President Richard Nixon, who pledged to reestablish
"law and order" by· naming conservative jurists and "strict
25
constructionists."
A more contemporary strain originated with the
Senate rejection of Circuit Judge Robert Bork, whom President Ronald
Reagan had nominated for the Supreme Court in 1987.
2. The Current Impasse
Political factors appear more relevant to the present dilemma than the
persistent one, but politics permeate each, thus obscuring their exact
relationship. These notions indicate that political phenomena underlie
the current problem, and both seem responsible for recent Sixth Circuit
appointments.
The existing difficulty, therefore, warrants some
treatment, even though closeness in time frustrates comprehension of
precisely what transpired.
a. General Overview of the Current Impasse
Over the last decade and a half, distrust, partisan wrangling,
divisiveness and paybacks have often characterized the judicial selection
process. For virtually this entire period, judicial selection proceeded in a
milieu of divided government, with one party controlling the White
House, which has nomination and appointment powers, and the other
party having a Senate majority, which must give its advice and consent
for confirmation.
Several reasons explain why greater controversy has accompanied
judicial selection for the regional circuits. First, there have been few
Supreme Court vacancies in the last decade and those that arose have

22

See N.Y. City Bar, supra note 3, at 374.
See Bermant et al., supra note 2, at 327.
" See supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text.
25
See, e.g., DAVID M. O'BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULEITE 20 (1988) (discussing judgeships as
symbol of presidential power); Roger E. Hartley & Lisa M. Holmes, Increasing Senate
Scrutiny of Lower Federal Court Nominees, 80 JUDICATURE 274, 274 (1997) (commenting on
increased attention and scrutiny of appointment of lower federal court judges).
23
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not been sharply contested. After the tumultuous appointment of Justice
26
Clarence Thomas, chief executives have nominated, and the Senate has
approved, individuals who appeared to possess moderate political
views. Second, district court openings have traditionally been, and
essentially remain, the prerogative of senators who represent the areas in
which vacancies occur. Notions of senatorial courtesy and respect and
the idea that trial court seats constitute perhaps the last remaining
vestige of unalloyed political patronage mean they are rarely
controversial. Third, the regional circuits are increasingly perceived as
the courts of last resort which resolve critical public policy issues, such as
religious freedom and federalism, partly because the Supreme Court
27
hears so few appeals.
These ideas do not suggest that the process has inexorably spiraled
downward for a decade and a half; there have been periods when
appeals court selection functioned rather smoothly. For example,
President George H.W. Bush and Republican and Democratic senators
seemingly attempted to cooperate after the confirmation battle over
Justice Thomas. This development fostered Justice David Souter's
relatively non-controversial appointment and comparatively effective
lower court selection in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, at the conclusion
of the Bush presidency, 100 appeals and district court positions remained
open. Democratic senators claimed the vacancies resulted from the chief
executive's failure to nominate steadily qualified persons whom
28
Democrats deemed acceptable. Republicans ascribed the unfilled seats

26
See, e.g., JANE MA YER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING OF
CLARENCE THOMAS (1994) (discussing appointment of Clarence Thomas to United States
Supreme Court); TlMOTifY PHELPS & HELEN WINTERNITZ, CAPITOL GAMES (1997)
(discussing appointment of Clarence Thomas to United States Supreme Court).
27
See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Move to Limit Clinton's Judicial Choices Fails, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
30, 1997, at Dl (discussing Senate rejection of proposal to give individual senators greater
role in appointment of federal appellate judges); Obstruction of Justice, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
May 19, l997, at 9 (reporting Republican conference's vote to "respond legislatively to
judicial activism"); Jeffrey Rosen, Obstruction of Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2002, § 6, p. 38
(discussing obstructions in process of appointing judges); see also RICHARD POSNER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS 80-81, 194-95 (1996) (proposing remedies to problem of federal courts'
increased caseload); Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996
SUP. CT. REV. 403 (1997) (commenting on reasons why Supreme Court's docket has
decreased despite increased volume of cases brought to Court for review).
28
See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. 52538 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Biden)
(commenting on lack of nominations for federal court judges); Sheldon Goldman, Bush's
Judicial Legacy: The Final Imprint, 76 JUDICATURE 282, 284 (1993) (discussing whether Bush
administration invested sufficient resources in judicial selection). See generally Carl Tobias,
More Women Named Federal Judges, 43 FLA. L. REV. 477 (1991) (assessing why President
George Bush increased percentage of women appointed for federal judgeships during third
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to the Senate majority's slowed consideration of Bush nominees because
senators controlling the chamber anticipated that a Democratic candidate
29
might capture the White House.
During the Clinton Administration, there were similarly certain
unusual times in which judicial appointments to the appellate courts
proceeded relatively well. For example, close cooperation between
Clinton and Democrats who held a Senate majority prompted
30
confirmation of more than 100 judges during 1994. Sixty nominees
correspondingly secured approval four years later when Republican
31
senators had recaptured the body.
From January 1995, when the GOP assumed Senate control, thus
reinstituting a divided government, until the Clinton Administration's
conclusion, the dynamics of partisanship, divisiveness, and payback
generally dominated selection.
Thus, upon President Clinton's
departure from the White House, there were almost 30 openings on the
regional circuits - practically the same number as the time of his
32
inauguration.
The 2000 elections left Republicans with a one-vote
Senate majority and enabled President George W. Bush to lead a
government that was not divided. However, this opportunity proved
short-lived when Senator James Jeffords (R-VT) became an independent
33
in May 2001, a development which profoundly affected appointments
by according the Democrats Senate control.

year of his term and its consequences).
29
See Goldman, supra note 28. See generally Carl Tobias, Rethinking Federal Judicial
Selection, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1257, 1270-74 (discussing differences between Bush
administration's and Reagan administration's approach to federal judicial appointments).
30
See Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Selection Under Clinton: A Midterm Examination, 78
JUDICATURE 276, 279 (1995); Carl Tobias, Increasing Balance on the Federal Bench, 32 Haus. L.
REV. 137, 154 (1995).
1
'
See Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's Second Term Judiciary: Picking
Judges Under Fire, 82 JUDICATURE 265, 267 (1999); Carl Tobias, Choosing fudges at the Close of
the Clinton Administration, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 827, 841-44 (2000); Carl Tobias, Leaving a
Legacy on the Federal Courts, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 315, 325-27 (1999). For reasons why this
occurred, see supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
32
See
vACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2000), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/12042000/judgevacancy.htm; see also Carl Tobias,
Dear President Bush, 67 Mo. L. REV. 1, 1 (2002) (suggesting how President Bush might
discharge duty to appoint federal judges); Nick Anderson, Democrats Look to Battles After
Ashcroft, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2001, at A14 (commenting on vast number of federal judicial
positions Bush must fill in term as President).
" See Neil A. Lewis, Washington Talk: Road to Federal Bench Gets Bumpier in Senate, N.Y.
TIMES, June 26, 2001, at Al6 [hereinafter Lewis, Washington Talk); David Rogers, Sen. Jeffords
Defects From GOP, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2001, at Al6; Editorial, True Bipartisanship, WALL ST.
J., May 31, 2001, at A16.
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b. Specific Analysis of the Current Impasse
This subsection attempts to recount the current problem accurately by
consulting the behavior and observations of many participants in judicial
selection. I scrutinize the second Clinton Administration and George W.
Bush's Administration to date, stressing the initial year of each, because
appointments during 1997 and 2001 were relatively similar and recent.
This emphasis is appropriate, even though the present complication
appeared to originate earlier, perhaps with Judge Bork's 1987 rejection.
Numerous political factors which accompanied selection throughout
the fifteen years contributed significantly to the current situation,
although certain features of the generic dilemma have implicated
appointments since 1997, particularly in that year and 2001. Each chief
executive and the Senate- including the Majority Leader, the Judiciary
Committee, its chair and panel members, and specific senators - were
principally responsible for many phenomena that comprise the existing
difficulty. These public officials alone or in combination could have
remedied or ameliorated numerous problems if they exercised the
requisite political will.
The time that the Clinton and Bush Administrations and the respective
Senates required to conclude nomination and confirmation were
substantial and analogous during 1997 and 2001. For example, in 1997,
nominations on average consumed over 600 days, with confirmations
34
needing a record high of 183 days.
Much delay which involved
appointments continued to happen between the date an opening arose
and the president submitted a nominee.
(1) Nomination Process
The dearth of confirmations during 1997 and 2001 resulted in part
from slow nominee submission. Some temporal complications should be
ascribed to both chief executives and to individual senators or other
political officers who recommended designees for presidential
However, in 1997, additional participants, namely
consideration.
Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT), then chair of the Judiciary Committee;
Senator Trent Lott (R-MS), then Senate Majority Leader; and other GOP
senators delayed processing out of concerns regarding matters such as

34
See Viveca Novak, Empty-Bench Syndrome, TIME, May 26, 1997, at 37; see also Orrin G.
Hatch, There's No Vacancy Crisis in the Federal Courts, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 1997, at A15
(claiming confirmation required 91 days and nominations required 618 days); Editorial,
Clearing the Bench, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 17, 1997, at A16 (reciting similar statistics);
supra note 20 and accompanying text (affording comparable data for 1980-1995).
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"judicial activism." During 2001, their analogues, Senators Patrick Leahy
(D-VT) and Tom Daschle (D-SD), might have similarly slowed
consideration because Democrats found the political perspectives of
some Bush nominees troubling.
The presidents apparently had certain responsibility for the small
number of appointments attributable to delays in tendering nominees.
For instance, on January 7, 1997, the Clinton Administration forwarded
22 attorneys for nomination, many of whom had been nominated in the
previous Congress and had testified in confirmation hearings or had
secured favorable committee votes. President Bush did not announce his
35
initial set of nominees until May 2001. Both chief executives thereafter
gradually, albeit rather sporadically, provided additional names.
Illustrative was each president's tendency to suggest large groups as the
36
Senate neared a recess. Most designees of the two chief executives were
apparently well qualified, and a number had served on the federal or
37
state bench. Some seemed to possess moderate political views, several
were affiliated with the party that did not control the presidency, and
38
previous presidents had named a few as district judges.
In fairness, the chief executives' tendency to submit many persons
immediately before Senate recesses and their general treatment of the
nomination process posed certain difficulties. Tendering numerous
people at once on the eve of a Senate recess frustrated Judiciary
Committee consideration. Clinton had forwarded only eight new
designees by June 1997. Senator Hatch found some unacceptable in the
January group, thereby enabling him to claim that the Committee lacked
39
sufficient nominees for effective Committee processing.
35
See The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates Twentytwo to the Federal Bench (Jan. 7, 1997); REMARKS ANNOUNCING NOMINATIONS FOR THE

FEDERAL JUDICIARY, 37 PuB. PAPERS 19 (May 14, 2001) (hereinafter PRESIDENT'S REMARKS).
36
The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates Thirteen to the
Federal Bench (July 31, 1997); Jonathan Ringel, Bush Nominates 18 to Federal Bench, AM. LAW.
MEDIA, Aug. 6, 2001 [hereinafter Ringel, Bush Nominates 18].
37
PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, supra note 35; see Carl Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts in an
Election Year, 49 SMU L. REV. 309, 315 (1996); Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's
First Term Judiciary: Many Bridges to Cross, 80 JUDICATURE 254, 258-59 (1997). See generally
143 CONG. REC. S5653 (daily ed. June 16, 1997) (statement of Sen. Leahy); infra notes 70, 114116 and accompanying text.
38
See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 37; Shannon P. Duffy, Clinton Announces
Nominees for Eastern District Court, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 4, 1997, at l; David G.
Savage, Bush Picks 11 for Federal Bench, L.A. DMES, May 10, 2001, at Al; see also infra notes
68-70, 114-16, and accompanying text.
39
See Hatch, supra note 34; see also Neil A. Lewis, Keeping Track; Vacant Federal
Judgeships, N.Y. DMES, Aug. 11, 1997, at Al2. Analogous are President Bush's submission
of rather few additional nominees by June 2001 and Senator Leahy's apparently
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Neither administration proffered designees for every opening, which
would have permitted it to pressure the Judiciary panel and the Senate,
although there was little reason to provide more individuals than Hatch
40
and Leahy had suggested they would consider. In 1997 and 2001, both
presidents had nominated more persons than the respective Committee
chairs had indicated the panel would review. Clinton and Bush also had
to balance expediency and careful examination of nominees' capabilities
and character, because designees who proved controversial or lacked
competence or were unethical might have eroded administration
credibility and could have slowed or jeopardized the process.
Particular senators or other political figures from the areas where
vacancies arose who proposed individuals to the chief executives may
have delayed nominations during 1997 and 2001. For example, in
jurisdictions without Senate members from the president's party,
designating the officials who were to suggest attorneys or treatirig
demands that senators participate consumed resources. During the
Clinton Administration, GOP senators from Arizona and Washington
41
insisted that they be involved and even recommend lawyers. When
President Bush was preparing his initial appeals court slate, lack of
consultation with the Maryland Democratic senators may have jettisoned
42
one designee's nomination, and similar circumstances in California
43
seemingly led another candidate to withdraw. .
The Clinton and Bush Administrations are largely responsible for the
44
slow transmittal of nominees. Insofar as both administrations could

considering unacceptable some nominees included in the May package.
40
During 1997, Senator Hatch typically conducted one hearing each month that the
105th Senate was in session for one appellate, and four or five district court, nominees. See
infra note 48 and accompanying text. Senator Leahy followed a somewhat similar
approach during much of 2001. Ringel, Bush Nominates 18, supra note 36.
1
•
See Peter Callaghan, Senators Agree on Selecting Judges, NEWS TRIBUNE, Aug. 12, 1997,
at Bl; Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Has a Chance to Shape the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1997, § 1, at
30 [hereinafter Lewis, Clinton Has a Chance to Shape the Courts]; see also 143 CONG. REC.
S2538-41 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Biden) (saying GOP senators may have
so intimated).
" See David L. Greene & Thomas Healy, Bush Sends Judge List to Senate, BALT. SUN,
May 10, 2001, at lA; Lewis, Washington Talk, supra note 33; see also infra note 118 and
accompanying text.
" See Jean 0. Paso et al., Cox Gives up Shot at Judgeship, L.A. TIMES, l\1ay 26, 2001, at Al;
Henry Weinstein, Rep. Cox Called Likely Judicial Nominee, L.A. nMES, Apr. 5, 2001, at Al; see
also Savage, supra note 38.
" See, e.g., Helen Dewar, Confirmation Process Frustrates President; Clinton Wants Senate
GOP to Pick Up Pace, WASH. POST, July 25, 1997, at A21; Greg Pierce, Clinton vs. Clinton,
WASH. nMES, Aug. 12, 1997, at A6; President's Counsel Quits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1996, at
B22; Savage, supra note 38.
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have encouraged senators and other political officers to speed their
recommendations for the presidents, Executive Branch staff might have
done more or been frustrated by the "start-up" costs of creating an
administration.
illustrative was the time each president spent
assembling a Justice Department.
In short, Clinton and Bush discharged their nomination duties rather
similarly in 1997 and 2001. To be sure, the administrations did not rely
on identical practices, but the differences were merely of degree. Both
chief executives could also have anticipated or remedied some problems
experienced by deriving lessons from previous selection endeavors,
although certain difficulties might be inherent in the process.
(2) ABA Committee
Throughout the 104th Congress, the American Bar Association (ABA)
Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary, which has rated candidates'
qualifications since the mid-twentieth century, continued to provide that
45
valuable service.
Nevertheless, Senator Hatch expressed mounting
concern about ABA participation and, in February 1997, he terminated
formal Bar Association involvement with the Senate, although President
46
Clinton relied upon the entity's rankings for his entire second term. In
March 2001, the Bush Administration correspondingly informed the
ABA that President Bush would not seek its input before tendering
47
nominations.
(3) Confirmation Process
During 1997 and 2001, the Senate Judiciary Committee bore partial
responsibility for slowed appointments principally by failing to
investigate, hold hearings for, and vote on additional nominees. For

" For the proposition included in the text as well as the notions that the ABA is overly
political and too slow, see MILLER REPORT, supra note 2, at 5-6, 8, 11. See generally
AMERICAN BAR AsSCX:IATION, STANDING COMMITIEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY-WHAT IS IT
AND
How
IT
WORKS
(1983)
available
at
http: I I www .abanet.org/ scfedjud /backgrounder.html.
46
See, e.g., Terry Carter, A Conservative Juggernaut, A.B.A. J., June 1997, at 32; N. Lee
Cooper, Standing Up to Critical Scrutiny, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1997, at 6.
" See Letter from Alberto Gonzales, White House Counsel, to Martha Barnett, ABA
President (Mar. 22, 2001); see also Laura Little, The ABA's Role in Prescreening Federal Judicial
Candidates, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 37, 37 (2001). Democrats' insistence on ABA input
led to more delay, but the future influence that the ABA will have is unclear. See Senate
Judiciary Comm.: Hearings on Judicial Nominations, 107th Cong. (Feb. 26, 2002)
(statement of Sen. Leahy). See generally Jonathan Groner, ABA Adjusts to Role on Judges,
LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 5, 2002, at 10.
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instance, the panel normally held a hearing in which one appellate court
nominee and four or five district court designees testified each month of
the 105th Congress's initial session and during much of the Second
Clinton Administration. However, the committee did not invariably
adhere to the schedule; and the Senate had confirmed only nine judges
48
by early September 1997. President Bush and other observers similarly
criticized the Senate for failing to hold enough hearings, particularly for
appeals court nominees, and for approving a mere 28 judges during
2001, although the Committee apparently operated better and had
49
conducted hearings for all district court designees by spring 2002.
The few 1997 appointments might be ascribed to inadequate
Committee resources and to politics. For example, Senator Hatch
resolved the ongoing controversy about the ABA. Republican Senate
members discussed the confirmation responsibilities of the panel, its
chair and specific senators, but ultimately maintained the status quo.so
These disputes consumed resources that could have been devoted to
approving judges. The comparatively few confirmations in 2001 might
similarly have resulted from the panel's commitment of deficient
1
resources to the process and from politics.s Senator Leahy did invoke
special measures to expedite review, namely exceptional hearings during
2
the August recess.s Insofar as particular Democratic members delayed
nominees, they could have been "paying back" the GOP for its slowed

48
See Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal fudges in the Second Clinton Administration, 24
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 741 (1997). Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.), who served as Committee
chair from 1987 until 1994, claimed that there were two hearings each month in his tenure.
See 143 CONG. REC. S2538, S2539 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997).
" See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Bush and Democrats in Senate Trade Blame for fudge Shortage,
N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2002, at A9; Editorial, Judicial Nominations Scorecard, WASH. POST, Aug.
9, 2002, at A22. Most controversial were the rejection of Judges Priscilla Owen and Charles
Pickering on 10-9 party-line votes after contentious hearings and debate. See Albert R.
Hunt, The Politics of Lifetime Appointments, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2002, at Al9; Neil A. Lewis,
Democrats Reject Bush Pick in Battle Over Court Balance, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2002, at Al; Neil
A. Lewis, First Punch in the Revived Bench-Tipping Brawl, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2002, at§ 1, p.
35.
50
See sources cited supra note 26; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
51
I rely here on the Symposium On The Judicial Appointments Process, 10 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1, 1-176 (2001); Senate Judiciary Comm.: Hearings on Judicial Nominations,
supra note 47 (Feb. 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy), (Mar. 19, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Hatch); Jonathan Ringel, Picking fudges: The Art of the Deal, THE RECORDER, Apr. 30, 2001, at
l; Ringel, Bush Nominates, supra note 36; William Safire, Battle of the Blue Slips, N.Y. TIMES,
May 10, 2001, at A33.
52
See Senate Judiciary Comm.: Hearings on Potential Judicial Nominations (Aug. 22.
& Aug. 27, 2001); see also Neil A. Lewis, Democrats Are Pushed on judicial Nominees, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, at§ lA, p. 22.
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3

treatment of Clinton designees.s Moreover, the May determination of
Senator James Jeffords (R-VT) to assume independent status meant that
the Senate did not conclude an organizational agreement until July,
54
which postponed the process' institution and felicitous operation.
In fairness, public officials who have life tenure and exercise the great
power of the United States warrant deliberate consideration to insure
that they are qualified, while appropriately balancing nominee scrutiny
and prompt processing is subtle and complex. Senator Hatch claimed he
preferred to discharge this obligation with substantial care, but politics
apparently contributed as much as caution to delayed confirmation.ss
Senator Lott and the Republican leadership seemed to be more
responsible for slowed consideration during 1997. The Senate had
approved only nine judges by September of that year, although the
Judiciary Committee had voted favorably on numerous others and sent
6
their names to the floor.s Some observers believe Senator Daschle and
7
Democratic leaders behaved similarly in 2001.s The pressures imposed
by other critical business as well as the chamber's unanimous consent
procedure may explain certain delays in placing nominees with panel
approval on the Senate calendar and according them floor debates and
votes.

53
See, e.g., Jess Bravin, Aid Bill is Stalled By Bid to Force Votes on Judges, WALL ST. J., Oct.
17, 2001, at Al6; Paul A. Gigot, How Feinstein is Repaying Bush on Judges, WALL ST. J., May 9,
2001, at A26; Hunt, supra note 49; Neil A. Lewis, Party Leaders Clash in Capitol Over Pace of
Filling Judgeships, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2001, at A33.
54
See supra note 33. The presidents were also responsible because, in early 1997 and
2001, each tendered few names, some of whom the chair or his colleagues opposed, and
sent others irregularly, thus slowing the process. However, Hatch's claim that he lacked
nominees to process seemed unconvincing, as delay also resulted from the few hearings
for, and votes on, nominees and senators' opposition. Similarly, by the conclusion of 2001,
Bush had furnished enough names, but that may have been too late. See supra notes 36, 3940 and accompanying text.
55
Hatch faced conflicts in Senate traditions and obligations to GOP senators who
opposed activist judges. He did criticize opposition to some nominees and resist the
challenge to Senate traditions, and the 1997 record resembled some in prior similar periods.
See 143 CONG. REC. S2538-41 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997); see also Ted Gest et al., The GOP's
Judicial Freeze -A Fight to See Who Rules Over the Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 26,
1997, at 23; Neil A. Lewis, Republicans Seek Greater Influence in Naming Judges, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 26, 1997, at 1; Novak, supra note 34. But see supra text accompanying note 49.
56
This dynamic was similar to Republican consideration of nominees during the 1996
election year. See Hatch, supra note 34; 143 CONG. REC. S8041, S8045 (daily ed. July 24,
1997) (statement of Sen. Leahy); see also Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 37, at 257
(recounting 1996 treatment); Tobias, supra note 48 (same).
57
See David Savage, Bush's Nominees Go 28 for 80 in Senate, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2001, at
A12.
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However, the small number of judges confirmed in 1997, particularly
as contrasted with earlier periods, suggests that considerable
responsibility could be assigned the Senate majority leadership and its
inability to schedule floor votes. At the 105th Congress' outset, Lott
58
pledged to evaluate assiduously Clinton nominees.
That spring,
Senator Leahy, who was then the Judiciary Committee ranking minority
member, and additional Democrats responded by explaining how they
had facilitated selection in GOP presidencies by calling for floor debate
59
and votes on nominees.
(4) Nomination and Confirmation
In 1997 and 2001, some Executive Branch and Senate employees who
worked on appointments may not have appreciated the problem's
gravity, as manifested in the uneven pace of nominations and of
Committee consideration. Numerous observers, including senators,
asserted that the present difficulty and much delay were animated
primarily by politics and even by concerns related to nominees' political
views. For example, in 1997, Senators Joseph Biden (D-DE) and Paul
Sarbanes (D-MD) claimed that their Republican colleagues were
60
politicizing selection and modifying 200 years of tradition.
A project some observers considered political and which implicated
the current dilemma and slow processing was the effort of Senator
Charles Grassley (R-IA) to assess how regional circuits use and distribute
61
judicial resources.
For instance, his subcommittee held hearings to
ascertain if the appeals courts needed additional positions or even their
62
existing complements. Perhaps most significant to the issues treated in

58
See Lewis, Clinton Has a Chance to Shape the Courts, supra note 41. See generally Gest et
al., supra note 55; Novak, supra note 34.
59
Senators Biden and Sarbanes urged that all nominees have floor votes. See 143
CONG. REC. 52538-41 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997). When Lott threatened delay, Leahy
recounted nominees, with bipartisan support and unanimous panel votes, to courts under
pressure. Id. at 55653 (daily ed. June 16, 1997) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
60
Id. at S2538, S2541. Biden even said the GOP was attempting to prevent Clinton
appeals court appointments. Id. at S2538. Others offered similar ideas. Professor Sheldon
Goldman said "a newly-elected president has [never] faced this sort of challenge to his
judicial nominations," while Professor Geoffrey Stone found the GOP actions irresponsible.
See Gest et al., supra note 55 (quoting both professors).
61
See Charles E. Grassley, Chairman's Report on the Appropriate Allocation of
Judgeships in the United States Courts of Appeals (1999) [hereinafter Grassley's Report];
Tobias, supra note 48.
2
•
See, e.g., Conserving Judicial Resources: Considering the Appropriate Allocation of
Judgeships in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Before the Sen. Judiciary
Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight & the Courts, 105th Cong. Oune 25, 1998); Conserving
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this essay was Chief Judge Martin's written statement, in which he
asserted the Sixth Circuit could operate better with several more
63
members but was "functioning effectively and efficiently."
It was
working well in part through "practices designed to enhance [the
tribunal's] efficiency and improve" justice's administration and "heavy
reliance on visiting judges [that he warned] can lead to instability and
64
unpredictability in the law of the circuit." Senator Grassley issued a
report which found that few courts required new positions and that the
Sixth Circuit should have no additional judgeships until the tribunal
"takes alternative approaches to manage its caseload efficiently" by, for
example, "channeling more work to staff counsel and by granting oral
65
argument only [when] truly necessary."
The proper employment of appellate court resources is a legitimate
Senate concern. However, this endeavor may have delayed
appointments to regional circuits, which have experienced large
percentages of openings, numerous judicial emergencies, and mounting
66
dockets.
Moreover, lawmakers have not created any appeals court
judgeships for twelve years, even though the Judicial Conference has
recommended that Congress authorize numerous positions, including
two for the Sixth Circuit. The entities based this proposal on expert,
conservative calculations and carefully assembled empirical information
67
regarding dockets and workloads.
Judicial Resources: Considering the Appropriate Allocation of Judgeships in the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Hearing Before the Sen. Judiciary Subcornrn. on Adrnin.
Oversight & the Courts, 105th Cong. (Feb. 5, 1997). Chief Judge Martin regretted the "press
of case related duties [did] not permit [him] to attend the hearing" on the Sixth and
Seventh Circuits but submitted a "written statement for inclusion in the record." See Letter
from Boyce F. Martin, Jr., Sixth Circuit Chief Judge, to Sen. Charles Grassley, Chair, Senate
Judiciary Subcornrn. on Admin. Oversight & the Courts (June 19, 1998); see also Statement of
Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr., Before the Subcornrn. on Admin. Oversight & the Courts
(June 25, 1998) [hereinafter Statement of Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr.].
63
See Statement of Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr., supra note 62, at 1. The practices
were staff screening of cases, alternatives to dispute resolution, opinions from the bench as
well as telephonic oral arguments in some cases and waivers in others. Id. at 3.
" Id.
" See Grassley's REPORT, supra note 61; see also Analysis of the Sixth Circuit 1, 4
(providing quoted material and view that some judges opposed more positions)
[hereinafter Sixth Circuit Analysis]; Tobias, supra note 48, at 749-50 (finding that many
judges on several of regional circuits opposed increasing courts' judicial complements).
66
Twenty-five seats were open. See THE THIRD BRANCH, Aug. 1997, at 5; VACANCIES IN
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (1997). For data on docket growth, see POSNER, supra note 27, at 5864; LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 16, at 10.
67
Tobias, supra note 48, at 753 (describing proposal as conservative); see also S.1145,
106th Cong. (1997) (providing judgeships bill); 143 CONG. REC. S2538, S2540 (daily ed. Mar.
19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Biden) (claiming that Conference documented needs to fill
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Rather similar developments attended selection in 2001. For example,
three of the eleven appellate court nominees forwarded by Bush during
May received confirmation that year. 68 Senator Leahy and other
Democrats, such as Senator Charles Schumer (0-NY), publicly
announced that the Senate would accord prompt approval to designees
69
they found capable and politically moderate. For instance, the Senate
easily confirmed Judge Roger Gregory and Judge Barrington Parker,
70
whom President Clinton had named earlier.
Many activities of senators whose party did not control the White
House substantiated the assertions that the current problem and delay
were politically motivated, in particular by concerns related to nominees'
perceived ideological perspectives. Illustrative have been the numerous
appellate openings that senators find more important than district
courts, because the shrunken Supreme Court caseload and the
applicability of regional circuits' decisions to multiple states mean they
71
increasingly serve as courts of last resort for those locales.
(5) Prospects for Change
Insofar as certain political phenomena that accompanied appointments
in 1997 and 2001 and led to the present dilemma are intrinsic, they might
resist amelioration. For example, the evaluation of persistent vacancies
indicated that measures which increase efficiency and resources will
only limit delay that is not attributable to politics. Nonetheless, the
analysis of political factors which constitute . the existing problem
suggested that public officers might remedy the situation, if they had
sufficient political will. Indeed, politics are all that seemed to prevent
Presidents Clinton and Bush from expeditiously submitting additional

vacancies and to authorize more judges but GOP urged decommissioning of judgeships);
Letter from Leonadis Ralph Mecham, Sec'y, to Sen. Patrick Leahy (May 28, 2002) (urging
action on Conference proposals) (on file with author).
68
See, e.g., Jonathan Groner, Placing Bets on Bush Bench, LEGAL TIMES, May 13, 2002, at 1
[hereinafter Groner, Placing Bets]; supra notes 35, 49 and accompanying text. But see infra
notes 69-70, 114-16 and accompanying text.
69
See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, More Battles Loom Over Bush's Nominees for Judgeships, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, at§ 1, p. 24; sources cited supra note 47; see also infra notes 114-16 and
accompanying text.
70
See Mark Hamblett, Parker Brings Experience and Intellect to Court, N.Y.L. J., Oct. 25,
2001, at l; Neil A. Lewis, Bush Appeals for Peace on His Picks for the Bench, N.Y. TIMES, May
10, 2001, at A29; Unappealing Judges, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 16, 2002, at A18. Clinton gave
Gregory a recess appointment to the Fourth Circuit. See Allison Mitchell, Senators Confirm 3
fudges, Including Once-Stalled Black, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2001, at A28.
71
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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candidates with moderate political views and a majority of senators from
promptly confirming them.
(6) Effects of the Current Impasse
The current difficulty has created many problems, some of which
72
resemble ones the permanent dilemma fosters.
For instance, the
present dilemma has imposed analogous pressures on tribunals and
litigants, impacts witnessed in factors, such as judicial workloads. The
district courts have substantial civil backlogs, so that individuals and
73
entities must wait years to conclude their cases.
Moreover, docket
increases and vacancies during 1997 compelled Ninth Circuit
cancellation of 600 oral arguments, while similar circumstances required
74
the Sixth Circuit to postpone 60 arguments.
In July, the impending
crisis, fueled by numerous empty seats and difficulties, led seven
national legal organizations to write an open letter requesting that the
chief executive and the Senate Majority Leader devote the requisite
resources to facilitate selection. 75 At the end of 1997 and 2001, Chief
Justice William Rehnquist, in nearly identical terms, similarly urged both
76
the White House and Senate to expedite confirmation. The concepts
above demonstrate how vacant judgeships can disadvantage millions of
people. To the extent that the public finds the existing impasse results
from partisan politics, the actions may erode respect for the government,
especially presidents and senators.

n
73

See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
See Gest et al., supra note 55; see also Robert Schmidt, The Costs of Judicial Delay, LEGAL

TIMES, Apr. 28, 1997, at 6 (assessing substantial civil backlogs and additional costs imposed
by delayed selection).
" Novak, supra note 34; Chronic Federal Judge Shortage Puts Lives, Justice On Hold, LAS
VEGAS REV.-J., Aug. 13, 1997, at A9 (providing information on 6th Circuit); Bill Kisliuk,
Judges' Conference Slams Circuit-Splitting, Vacancies, THE RECORDER, Aug. 19, 1997, at 1
(providing information on 9th Circuit).
75
See Letter to William J. Clinton, President, from N. Lee Cooper, ABA President, et
al., July 14, 1997, reprinted in 143 CONG. REC. 58046 (daily ed. July 24, 1997); see also sources
cited supra note 46.
" See William H. Rehnquist, 2001 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, available at
http: I I www .supremecourtus.gov I publicinfo I year-end /2001 year-endreport.htrnl;
William H. Rehnquist, 1997 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, 30 THE THIRD BRANCH,
NEWSLETTER OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 1 (1998) available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb
/jan98ttb/january.htrn. Similar ideas appear in Judicial Nominations Scorecard, supra note 49
and a resolution adopted at the ABA's recent annual meeting. See Jonathan Groner, ABA:
Speed Up Judicial Nomination Process, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 14, 2002, at 4.

2003]

Sixth Circuit Federal Judicial Selection

741

C. Sixth Circuit Developments

The rise and development of the factors which have made Sixth
Circuit appointments controversial in some ways resemble and in some
ways diverge from the national phenomena discussed above. This
court's problems also are comparatively recent and rather complicated.
For example, the dispute over the Michigan vacancies appears
principally to implicate political infighting among the state's past and
current United States senators. However, the controversy about the
Ohio positions seems to have national overtones and to be animated
partly by interest group concerns regarding the nominees' political
•
77
views.
Several considerations alone and in combination have meant that the
persistent difficulty had little applicability to the Sixth Circuit until the
last quarter century. These factors encompassed the court's rather small
docket and judicial complement and the relative infrequency with which
its seats opened. For instance, as recently as 1975, the Sixth Circuit, like
most appellate courts, terminated less than 1,000 appeals (tiny
percentages of which were complex); accorded most filings appellate
justice; operated with few active judges (9); and encountered rare
vacancies that chief executives and senators easily filled.
In the late 1970s, the Sixth Circuit sustained multiplying caseloads and
its membership grew to eleven when Congress enacted omnibus
78
judgeships legislation. Even burgeoning dockets and the concomitant
increase in the tribunal's complement apparently had limited effects on
appointments during the 1980s. Lawmakers approved four new
positions, while President Ronald Reagan promptly nominated, and the
Senate expeditiously confirmed, judges for the numerous openings
which arose. The court had no empty seats at his administration's end.
The longstanding ·vacancies problem, thus, lacked much historical
import for the Sixth Circuit, although it may explain selection over the
last several years.
In contrast, the present dilemma seems ~uite salient. A 1990 statute
9
expanded the tribunal to sixteen members. Some positions opened in

77
See, e.g., Michael Collins, Approval of Judges is Stalled, CINCINNATI POST, Nov. 17,
2001, at lA; Groner, Placing Bets, supra note 68; Lewis, supra note 33. See generally GERHARD,
supra note 5, at 213-19; sources cited supra notes 49, 68.
" See Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629-32 (1978); see also 28 U.S.C. § 44 (1994). See
generally WILLIAM MCLAUGHLAN, FEDERAL COURT CASELOADS (1984). I rely here on
GOLDMAN, supra note 5, at 285-345.
79
See Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5099 (1990); see also 28 U.S.C. § 44 (1994); Goldman,
supra note 28; Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint on the Judiciary: Carrying on a Tradition,
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the presidency of George H.W. Bush, who experienced problems filling
them, especially near his administration's end. Democratic senators
holding a majority ascribed the complications to tardy, erratic
nomination of people they deemed acceptable, while GOP chamber
members alleged Democrats slowed consideration of capable designees
because they hoped the Democratic candidate would win the
80
In any event, when Bush departed the White
presidential election.
81
House, the Sixth Circuit had some vacancies.
Judicial selection followed a somewhat analogous pattern over the
course of the Clinton presidency. For example, the administration
realized considerable success, particularly during the initial five years of
its tenure. The chief executive rather felicitously appointed to the
appellate court numerous well qualified judges, including Eric Clay, R.
Guy Cole, Jr., Martha Craig Daughtrey, Ronald Gilman, and Karen
82
Nelson Moore.
Clinton did encounter difficulty securing confirmation of his nominees
in his second term. Indeed, throughout most of 2000, the Sixth Circuit
operated with four empty seats for which the administration had
proposed three nominees, only one of whom it had suggested early that
year. In 1997, the chief executive tendered Helene White, a Michigan
Court of Appeals judge, and in 1999 forwarded Kathleen McCree Lewis,
an experienced Detroit litigator, but Senator Abraham precluded
83
Judiciary Committee hearings on both nominees.
In February 2000,
Clinton nominated Kent Markus, who had discharged several high-level
policy assignments in the Justice Department, for an Ohio seat, and he
84
received Senate treatment similar to that of White and Lewis.
Notwithstanding the administration's endeavors, when Clinton finished
his second term, the 16-member tribunal had four vacancies. In 2001, an
identical number (4) of active judges correspondingly assumed senior
74 JUDICATURE 294 (1991). See generally Tobias, supra note 29, at 1270-74.
"' See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
81
See VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (1992). See generally sources cited supra
note 78.
82
For example, Judges Daughtrey and Gilman had rendered distinguished service as
Tennessee state court judges, while Judge Cole was a bankruptcy judge. See FEDERAL
JUDICIAL ALMANAC (2002).
83
See, e.g., Nedra Pickler, Bush Picks Judge for Appeals Panel, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, June
27, 2002, at AlS; Jonathan Ringel, The Battle for the 6th Circuit, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001,
at 8.
84
See The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates Robert f.
Cindrich, Kent R. Markus, John Antoon, II and Phyllis J. Hamilton to the Federal Bench (Feb. 9,
2000); see also v ACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2001 ), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/judgevacancy.htrn; Ringel, supra note 83.
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85

status.
The numerous Sixth Circuit openings and the significant time that
they have lacked occupants may have detrimentally affected its efforts to
dispense appellate justice. For example, the Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals - which recently
undertook an evaluation of the appellate system at Congress's requestdetermined that the Sixth Circuit publishes fewer opinions than most
86
other appellate courts.
The tribunal only publishes opinions in 18
percent of the cases it reviews, which is five points below the national
87
average and one-half the rate provided by four courts. Moreover, the
Commission found that the Sixth Circuit concludes filings less
expeditiously from notice of appeal to final resolution than all tribunals
save the one which has the biggest caseload. The court also ranks tenth
for another indicium and eleventh for two additional criteria that the
88
commissioners employed in calculating time to disposition. The most
recent empirical data that the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
gathered shows Sixth Circuit resolution times have lengthened and its
89
comparative situation has deteriorated.
The Commission also ascertained that the court depended more
heavily on visiting judges over the preceding half-decade period than
9
any other tribunal. The relatively few published determinations and

85
These were Judge Gilbert Merritt, a Democratic appointee, as well as Judges Alan
Norris, Eugene Siler, and Richard Suhrheinrich, Republican appointees. See VACANCIES IN
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2001), supra note 84.
86
See Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals,
Working Papers, 93, tbl. 2 (1998); see also Commission on Structural Alternatives for the
Federal Courts of Appeals, Final Report (1998). See generally Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense
of Unpublished Opinions, 60 Omo ST. L. J. 177 (1999).
87
Working Papers, supra note 86, at 93, tbl. 8. Chief Judge Martin emphasized: except
for appeals resolved from the bench, all cases "terminated on the merits are accompanied
by a statement of reasons for the decision. Unlike some of our sister circuits that claim a
somewhat higher 'productivity' rate, the Sixth Circuit does not issue one word 'opinions'
which simply state that the decision below is 'affirmed."' Statement of Chief Judge Boyce
F. Martin, Jr., supra note 62, at 1.
88
See Working Papers, supra note 86, at 95, tbl.7. The Sixth Circuit did surpass the
system-wide average vis-a-vis the remaining two parameters deployed by the Commission.
Id.
89
See U.S. Courts of Appeals, Median Time Intervals in Cases Terminated After
Hearing or Submission, By Circuit During the 12-Month Period Ending Sept. 30, 2001.
Indeed, the Sixth Circuit presently resolves cases only a half month faster than the Ninth
Circuit, rather than 2.2 months quicker, as the Sixth Circuit did in 1997.
90
See Working Papers, supra note 86, at 96, tbl.8. Indeed, only eight of the 168 panels
that the appeals court constituted in the 1997 fiscal year were comprised of three active
Sixth Circuit appellate judges. See Sixth Circuit Analysis, supra note 65, at 3; accord
Statement of Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr., supra note 62, at 2 (asserting same).
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the slow disposition times are instructive measures of appellate justice
and efficacious performance. These measures involve critical process
values, such as open court access, while placing substantial reliance on
visitors can reduce judges' accountability, visibility and collegiality, limit
fairness to litigants, and permit less consistent decisionmaking. Chief
Judge Martin eloquently warned the Senate about these issues in the
91
statement prepared at Senator Grassley's behest.
The Sixth Circuit does function effectively in terms of certain
parameters. For instance, the Commission determined that the tribunal
surpasses the nationwide average for provision of oral arguments by ten
92
percentage points. Chief Judge Martin agreed that the court furnishes
"arguments in a greater percentage of our docket than some of our sister
circuits [and has] a long tradition of according oral argument unless the
93
parties waive" it. He also remarked that the Sixth Circuit performs
well, yet could operate better with two additional judgeships, which the
94
Judicial Conference concluded its caseload supported. Moreover, the
1999 report assembled by the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Administrative Oversight and the Courts ascertained the tribunal
functions efficiently and needs no more positions, while it noted that
new seats should be created only after the court institutes alternative
techniques to manage the circuit docket efficiently. Two examples that
would increase efficiency are delegating greater responsibility to the
tribunal's staff counsel and not permitting oral argument unless clearly
95
warranted.
The Senate evaluation praised the court for instituting the practices
meant to increase efficiency and enhance the administration of justice,
which Chief Judge Martin documented in his written statement. The
evaluation also lauded the "hard work of the Sixth Circuit's active and
96
senior judges." The study's recommendation that the tribunal depend

91
See supra note 62 and accompanying text; JUDITH MCKENNA, STRUCTURAL AND
OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 9-12 (1993) (discussing real or
perceived stress on courts); see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 1463, 1466-71 (1987) (assessing numerous, important process values).
92
See Working Papers, supra note 86, at 93, tbl. 2.
93
See Working Papers, supra note 86, at 93, tbl.2; Statement of Chief Judge Boyce F.
Martin, Jr., supra note 62, at 1. The Senate report found that the court's "policy of granting
oral argument in so many cases significantly increases [its] workload" which could be
reduced by doing so only when "truly necessary." Sixth Circuit Analysis supra note 65, at
1,4.
94
See Statement of Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr., supra note 62, at 4-5.
95
Sixth Circuit Analysis, supra note 65, at 1, 3.
%
See Sixth Circuit Analysis, supra note 65, at 2; Statement of Chief Judge Boyce F.
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more on staff counsel and grant fewer oral arguments, however, could
erode judicial accountability and visibility, increase bureaucratization
and restrict court access, sentiments which Chief Judge Martin
trenchantly articulated:
We have resisted, and will continue to resist, the adoption of
shortcut practices, such as the issuance of decisions that do not
contain an explanation of the rationale of the decision, or increasing
the reliance on the use of staff, rather than judges to prepare the
decision of the court. We believe that our approach insures that
judges will remain accountable for the exercise of their
97
constitutional responsibilities.
Therefore, although certain raw information from the Commission
indicates the Sixth Circuit may perform less well than it might, these
data are essentially inconclusive and additional material suggests the
tribunal operates rather effectively.

D. A Word About State-Specific Developments
The most crucial phenomenon implicating Michigan and Ohio is that
few active judges, particularly Republican appointees, from these states
now serve on the Sixth Circuit. Michigan GOP members and others who
are concerned about the situation should not forget that Senator
Abraham shares some responsibility for this circumstance. During the
late 1990s, he prevented Judge White and Ms. Lewis from having
98
Judiciary Committee hearings.
The Senator and his Republican
colleagues who represent states in the Sixth Circuit, such as Senator
Mitchell McConnell (R-KY), may also have stopped Senate consideration
of Kent Markus because they hoped George W. Bush would win the 2000
99
presidential campaign.

Martin, Jr., supra note 62, at 3-4.
"' See Statement of Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr., supra note 62, at 4. Accord THOMAS
E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL-THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEAL 1430 (1994) (noting ideals for appellate design); POSNER, supra note 27, at 26-28; CHRISTOPHER
E. SMITH, JUDICIAL SELF-INTEREST: FEDERAL JUDGES AND COURT ADMINISTRATION 94-125
(1995) (discussing growing judicial chambers and bureaucracy). The Senate Subcommittee
Study's scope, dearth of empirical data, and political nature are controversial. However,
the panel certainly possesses authority to monitor the appellate courts and their allocation
of resources, and the subcommittee did attempt to collect some data and seek the views of
judges that are informed by experience.
" For developments in the Clinton Administration, see supra notes 83-84 and
accompanying text.
99
The Ohio senators apparently did not participate in this activity, but they may have
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After Bush secured election, Senator Levin reportedly met with White
House officials to suggest that he might support the GOP
administration's nominees for Michigan vacancies if the two individuals
proposed by President Clinton received hearings or if President Bush
100
agreed to establish a bipartisan judicial nomination commission.
In
November 2001, Bush apparently responded by forwarding people for
three empty Michigan seats and eight months later he tendered a person
101
for the fourth opening. On May 9, 2001, the chief executive nominated
two designees for the Ohio vacancies, and the following December
102
submitted a name for the unfilled Kentucky seat.
Only the Kentucky
103
nominee has received Senate confirmation thus far.
It is critical that all states situated in every regional circuit have active
appellate judges on the court whose chambers are located in the states,
even though the Third Branch is not a representative institution. A jurist
who is stationed in a specific jurisdiction will qften have greater
familiarity with its substantive law, which can facilitate disposition of
104
appeals that involve diversity of citizenship, and with the state's legal
and other cultures, which may help to reconcile federal and local
105
policies.
Those living in a jurisdiction might also be more confident
about, and more readily accept, the determinations of a court which has
a resident judge. Indeed, when an appellate court includes no member

deferred to it. See, e.g., Tom Brune, Roadblocks to justice: judgeships Unfilled as Congress
Wrangles Over Appointees, NEWSDAY, May 9, 2002, at A46; Jack Torry, Court Nominations:
Sitting in Limbo, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 30, 2001, at SA.
100
See, e.g., Empty Chairs on the Bench, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Nov. 27, 2001, at A12; Carl
Levin & Debbie Stabenow, Bipartisanship Can End fudge Stalemate, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS,
Dec. 5, 2001, at AlS; Ringel, supra note 83 (discussing Sixth Circuit stalemate); Pickler, supra
note 83 (discussing same).
101
v ACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2002), supra note 15; v ACANCIES IN THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2001), supra note 84; see also Ringel, supra note 83.
102
See VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2001), supra note 84; Savage, supra note
38. On July 29, 2002, the Senate did confirm Judge Julia Gibbons, whom President Reagan
had first named to the Eastern District of Tennessee. See infra note 116 and accompanying
text.
103
See UK Professor Confirmed to Appeals Court, LoUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL, Nov. 16,
2002, at 1.
104
See 135 CONG. REC. S5027 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Hatfield). "State
law mastery" has become less critical in light of the comparatively few appeals taken in
diversity cases. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 97, at 98 (explaining Ninth Circuit decided 255
diversity appeals and over 5,800 federal question appeals); Carl Tobias, The Impoverished
Idea of Circuit-Splitting, 44 EMORY L.J. 1357, 1373 (1995).
105
This is the regional circuits' federalizing function. See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 10-13 (5th ed. 1994); John Minor Wisdom, Requiem for a Great
Court, 26 LOY. L. REV. 787, 788 (1980) (arguing circuit splitting and adding judges dilutes
federalizing function).
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(or too few judges) from a state for an extended time, residents can
become detached, and even alienated, from the regional circuits that
enunciate a growing body of federal law which covers them. The above
ideas will be magnified as docket increases and a shrunken Supreme
Court caseload increasingly transform the appellate tribunals into the
106
courts of last resort for their areas.
The Senate has long respected the
tradition whereby each jurisdiction in a regional circuit has a member
serve on the court, while Congress found the notion so important that it
107
recently received codification.
In sum, the previous analysis of the permanent vacancies dilemma and
of the current dilemma indicates these components might have
threatened the justice which the federal appeals courts deliver and that
the problems require immediate attention. The Second Part, therefore,
canvasses numerous measures which officers in every branch of the
federal government could implement to treat the complications.
II. ANALYSIS OF PREFERABLE SOLUTIONS
A. The Executive Branch and the Senate

The President and the Senate must make concerted efforts to fulfill
108
their respective selection duties. For instance, the Bush Administration
and the upper chamber should attempt to streamline those
responsibilities each discharges. They should also balance assessment of
nominee competence and character with the necessity for facilitating the
confirmation process.
Executive and legislative branch officials must confront politicization's
growth and appreciate that attempts to surmount it will prove
controversial and could be fruitless. The officials should cooperate,
strive to accommodate their different perspectives, and amicably resolve
disputes that materialize. The officials must also discontinue certain
behavior, such as blaming one another - conduct apparently motivated

106
See POSNER, supra note 27, at 58-64, 80-81, 194-95 (documenting growth of appeals
and Supreme Court's shrunken docket); Hellman, supra note 27 (documenting Supreme
Court's shrunken docket).
107
See Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 307, 111 Stat. 2493 (1997); 28 U.S.C. § 44(c) (1994).
108
See supra note 4. The persistent dilemma's best solution seems to be approval of
enough new seats to accord the bench every judge now authorized because this would
avoid numerous theoretical, practical, and legal difficulties. See Tobias, supra note 2, at 56970. Other approaches may only limit effectively irreducible temporal restraints. For
exposition of many remedies, some of which apply to the Sixth Circuit, see id. at 552-73.
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by gamesmanship and near-term political advantage. To the extent
politicization hampers appointments and fosters the perception that
public officers are subverting the best interests of the judiciary and the
nation for immediate, partisan benefit, the actions might diminish
respect for the process and its participants.
These notions pertain to Sixth Circuit as well as Michigan and Ohio
selection. For example, the chief executive should cooperate with
senators throughout the region by informally consulting them before he
actually tenders names. The choice of someone for the tribunal's next
vacant position affords an excellent opportunity to secure advice from
Senate members. Bush should maintain open lines of communication,
even after nomination, and redouble efforts to break the Michigan
logjam. All senators who represent jurisdictions of the Sixth Circuit
should closely confer on significant matters, including whether they will
continue to approve judges from the same states as seats become empty.
Senators in each jurisdiction must work together and identify an
acceptable designee when a vacancy arises. They might also think about
establishing an intrastate merit-selection panel, which would be
analogous to the Circuit Judge Nominating Commission instituted by
09
President Jimmy Carter, the entity that Michigan's senators proposed,1
or the district group which the Bush Administration and the California
110
Senate members formed last year. That idea may rectify or ameliorate
the difficulties in Michigan and Ohio, especially when the chamber
remains closely divided.

B. The Executive Branch
The administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush bear certain
111
Although Bush has now
responsibility for the present openings.
apparently tendered sufficient, competent designees who possess
moderate political perspectives for the Judiciary Committee to consider,
he must continue forwarding similar nominees at a pace which will

109
See, e.g., LARRY c. BERKSON & SUSAN B. CARBON, THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE
NOMINATING COMMISSION: ITS MEMBERS, PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES (1980); Elaine
Martin, Gender and Judicial Selection: A Comparison of the Reagan and Carter Administrations,
71JUDICATURE136, 140 (1988). See generally Tobias, supra note 28, at 1259-60.
110
See Carla Marinucci, Feinstein, Boxer Given A Say Over Judges, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, Apr. 27, 2001, at A3; Henry Weinstein, Process of Judge Selection Set Up Courts,
L.A. llMES, May 30, 2001, at Bl.
111
In early 1997 and 2001, each tendered few nominees, many of whom were qualified
and relatively moderate, but Hatch and Leahy claimed some were not. See supra notes 3538, 41-44 and accompanying text.
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expedite panel review. In fairness, he may have exercised caution to
avoid those missteps that can undermine a new administration's
credibility, slow the process, and even.jeopardize appointments.
The chief executive must assess and implement cooperative
approaches, as the measures could prove effective. Moreover, he can
depend on their previous use, should resort to more confrontational
possibilities become necessary. Bush must follow practices that will
improve the discharge of administration responsibilities. For instance,
the President could facilitate nominations by assembling candidates for
112
all existing and anticipated appellate court vacancies.
He should also
reexamine the decision to abrogate early ABA participation, because this
113
Another conciliatory notion is
determination has fostered delay.
submitting more people Democrats will find acceptable. For example,
the Senate expeditiously confirmed Bush's choice of Judge Barrington
Parker, whom Clinton had first placed on the Southern District of New
114
York. Elevation is concomitantly a time-honored measure, as senators
115
oppose few district judges nominated for appellate seats.
Indeed,
Judge Julia Gibbons, who is the first person Bush named to the Sixth
116
Circuit, was a Reagan district court appointee.
The chief executive should at least consider proposing additional
117
This concept may
capable lawyers with Democratic party affiliations.
be productive for tribunals which have substantial dockets and
protracted openings and are in jurisdictions that regularly elect
Democrats or have two Democratic senators. Illustrative is Maryland,
whose senators halted the nomination of a Bush designee because the
112
Bush could enhance nomination and confirmation through consultation with the
Committee and with senators and by implementing a merit-selection commission. See supra
notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
113
See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text; see also Leahy statement, supra note 47
(discussing delay in appointment procedure).
11
'
This happened because Parker had been confirmed once, had Democratic support,
and had served as a district judge, which informed analysis of his competence and
character. The decision resembled Clinton's elevation of Judge Sonia Sotomayor whom
Bush's father had named. See Neil Lewis, After Delay, Senate Approves fudge for Court in New
York, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1998, at B3.
115
Reagan, Clinton and Bush, Sr. relied on the technique of elevation. See Tobias, supra
note 48, at 742-43; Neil A. Lewis, Bush Picking the Kind of fudges Reagan Favored, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 10, 1990, at Al; Ruth Marcus, Bush Quietly Fosters Conservative Trend in Courts, WASH.
POST, Feb. 18, 1991, at A4; supra note 114.
11
•
See, e.g., James Brosnan, Senate Confirms Gibbons 95-0 for Appeals Bench, MEMPHIS
COMMERCIAL APPEAL, July 30, 2002, at B2; Editorial, At Last, A Beginning, CINCINNATI POST,
July 31, 2002, at 12A.
117
See supra note 38 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 38, 114 and
accompanying text (discussing other presidents' selection methods).
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individual had never practiced there and the President failed to consult
them, as well as the Sixth Circuit, with its large caseload and six
118
Several reasons, principally political differences between
vacancies.
the two political parties, explain the numerous "Michigan seats" which
119
are empty. For courts that experience increasing dockets and multiple,
lengthy openings, which are in states where those who suggest or can
stop nominees are stalemated, the chief executive might contemplate
exchanges, namely permitting Democratic recommendations of half as
120
many people as Republicans.
Bush could even allow Democrats to
propose nominees in return for judgeships legislation and, therefore,
inaugurate a bipartisan judiciary, a notion which may resolve the current
121
impasse. He might correspondingly strike an accord with the Judiciary
Committee Chair and the ranking minority member on a grearranged
1
number of designees who would secure approval each year.
If cooperative efforts to improve the process are not successful, the
chief executive could also analyze and use rather confrontational
techniques. For example, Bush might employ his office as a bully pulpit
to blame the Senate minority or to provoke more action by senators, and
he could force the question if he took the issue to the public. Analogous
measures are the nomination of attorneys for each vacancy or the
selective application of recess appointments, practices which might
pressure the Senate by publicizing or dramatizing how confirmation
disputes and prolonged vacancies can slow justice's delivery. The
Clinton recess appointment of Judge Roger Gregory to the Fourth Circuit
apparently facilitated his subsequent approval, but this was an unusual
circumstance and significant legal, political, and pragmatic factors
us For analysis of Maryland, see Lewis, supra note 33; Carl Tobias, The Bush
Administration and Appeals Court Nominees, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 103, 110, 114 (2001);
supra note 42 and accompanying text.
'" See Jonathan Groner & Jonathan Ringel, Judicial Nominee Horsetrading Heats Up As
Confirmation Process Gets Weighed, AM. LAW MEDIA, Sept. 4, 2001; Senate Nomination Process
Needs Repair, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 4, 2002, at AS; The Federal Court Blockade, GRAND RAPIDS
PRE.ss, May 12, 2002, at G2.
120
Senator Biden suggested that the GOP contemplated a similar "informal agreement"
yet claimed this violated a two-century tradition. 143 CONG. REC. 52538, 52541 (daily ed.
Mar. 19, 1997); see also sources cited supra note 41 (discussing appointment delays).
"Horsetrading" judgeships is quite controversial. See Groner & Ringel, supra note 119.
121
See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 37, at 271. President Eisenhower made a similar
offer in 1960. See id.; see also supra note 67 and accompanying text (affording judgeships bill
and Judicial Conference proposals).
122
I do not urge Bush to use the approaches mentioned in this paragraph, but he
should assess them and be pragmatic about confirming judges. Bush might consider how
important vacancies are and decide that filling the bench is less critical than specific
principles, such as naming the type of judges he prefers.
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123

restrict recess appointments' efficacy.
Bush has relied on, or
threatened the invocation of, these mechanisms, particularly to leverage
124
Democratic senators. However, the chief executive has cautiously used
125
them and he has voiced concern about preserving a dignified process.
These ideas apply to the Sixth Circuit and states within it. For
example, consultation is a cost-free approach on which the President
should depend. Insofar as limited consultation, or failure to consider
any advice given, fostered submission of several nominees for the
"Michigan seats" whom the state's Democratic senators apparently find
unacceptable, Bush might broach future designees with those senators or
126
accord their perspectives greater weight.
C. The Senate

All senators must analyze and implement conciliatory approaches
because they are as responsible as Presidents Clinton and Bush for the
present situation. Republicans should bear in mind that the Democratic
Senate actually approved more judges, despite how politicized
127
appointments were, when the GOP occupied the White House.
Democrats might remember that the people may blame them for
problems attributable to J;rotracted openings and that Republicans have
1
recaptured the chamber.
The minority, thus, should invoke cooperative techniques. It must be
responsive to administration endeavors, with effective consultation,
which provides candid, informative views on potential nominees, and
expeditious confirmation of all Clinton appointees whom Bush may
propose for elevation.
Numerous conciliatory measures are also
available. For example, when Democratic senators find GOP designees
unacceptable, they should recommend more palatable compromise

123
For example, if the Senate had not confirmed Circuit Judge Gregory, what effect
would have been accorded the opinions that the jurist authored or joined? See United
States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1012-14 (9th Cir. 1985) (discussing effect of recess
appointments); Thomas A. Curtis, Note, Recess Appointments to Article III Courts: The Use of
Historical Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1758 (1984).
124
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 49.
125
See Neil A. Lewis, Democrats Are Pushed on Judicial Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21,
2001, at Al, p. 22; see also sources cited supra note 49.
126
See sources cited supra notes 98-99, 116. Insofar as the Ohio nominees' perceived
political views have prompted interest group opposition and delay, Bush may want to
consider submitting more moderate designees and he should be realistic about the
influence the groups can wield. See supra notes 76, 83 and accompanying text.
127
See supra note 48 and accompanying text; Hartley & Holmes, supra note 25, at 277-78.
128
See sources cited supra notes 33, 49.
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129

candidates.
To the extent that delayed consideration has left seats empty, the
Senate leadership and specific senators should employ mechanisms that
speed appointments. For instance, the Judiciary Committee might
conduct hearings and vote on additional nominees with rather limited
scrutiny and perhaps abolish basically ceremonial sessions for those who
are not controversial. Insofar as Senator Leahy slowed processing of
individuals nominated due to their perceived ideological perspectives,
longstanding norms and considerable actual practice since 1990 indicates
130
that persons should receive hearings and panel votes.
The Majority
Leader should implement efforts which will facilitate full Senate
evaluation. For example, Senator William Frist (R-TN) could provide
votes on larger numbers of nominees by scheduling floor consideration
soon after he learns about Committee approval. To the extent that
disputes over particular designees created delay, the Majority Leader
131
might permit greater floor debate and more final votes on them.
Senators must calibrate the necessity for exacting assessment and
prompt confirmation, approving nominees who possess the requisite
qualifications to be superb jurists. Democrats could examine whether
they are overvaluing political views just as GOP Senate members should
have eschewed the quixotic venture to ascertain if nominees would be
132
"activist judges."
The concept of advice and consent in Article III
contemplates that senators will analyze whether candidates are capable
and honest, as well as comprehend and respect separation of powers.
However, senators should not slow processing to probe how a nominee,
if approved, might resolve individual appeals, because this could
129
In 1997, Washington Senators Slade Gorton (R) and Patty Murray (D) agreed on a
process to suggest designees. See Callaghan, supra note 41. Hatch should reconcile
disputes over process and nominees, mediating intractable ones, perhaps with help from
Senators Leahy or Daschle.
130
See supra notes 48, 77 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 35-39 and
accompanying text. The votes against Judges Owen and Pickering may be "paybacks," but
they did receive hearings. See supra note 49. Now that Bush has tendered sufficient,
acceptable names to facilitate processing, he should receive less criticism.
131
The Senate confirmation debate on Circuit Judges Merrick Garland, Marsha Berzon
and William Fletcher included some candid, healthy interchange. See 143 CONG. REC.
S2515-41 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (Garland); 144 CONG. REC. S11872 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998)
(Berzon and Fletcher); see also Neil A. Lewis, After Long Delays, Senate Confirms 2 Judicial
Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2000, at A16.
132
See, e.g., Should Ideology Matter?: Judicial Nominations 2001, Hearing Before the
Senate Judiciary Subcomm. On Admin. Oversight & the Courts, June 26, 2001; Hearings on
Judicial Activism:
Assessing the Impact Before the Senate Judiciary Constitution
Subcomrn., July 15, 1997; 143 CONG. REC. S2515 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Hatch); see also sources cited supra notes 25, 47.
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133

jeopardize courts' independence.
Democrats may also want to think about confirming people whose
ability and character would make them fine judges, as Republican
senators often so acted when they had a majority and there was a
134
Some Democrats remain concerned about how
Democratic president.
the GOP delayed Clinton nominees, while certain Republicans harbor
similar resentment over Justice Thomas's bitter confirmation fight and
Senate rejection of Judge Bork, behavior which they found animated
135
primarily by opposition to the jurists' substantive decision making.
A number of these notions implicate the Sixth Circuit as well as
Michigan and Ohio. Senator Stabenow's 2000 victory has enhanced
cooperation within the Michigan Senate delegation. She could even help
end the standoff, which has precluded President Bush from filling any of
the state's numerous empty seats and which denied the two Clinton
136
nominees Judiciary Committee hearings. For instance, if Bush suggests
one of them, Senators Stabenow and Levin might organize Democratic
137
support for several Bush designees.
Should all Democrats and a few
Republicans oppose the two rather controversial Ohio nominees, a
138
similar· arrangement may be warranted there.

D. The Judicial Branch
Members of the federal bench have less ability than political branch
officials to improve the existing situation because the Constitution
assigns the chief executive and the Senate greater responsibility for
selection. However, the judiciary could increase efforts to publicize

133
See, e.g., UNCERTAIN JUSTICE POLffiCS AND AMERICA'S COURTS 1-75, 121-71, 205-42
(2000). See generally Symposium, Judicial Independence and Accountability, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
311 (1999).
134
See supra notes 48, 77 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 35-39 and
accompanying text.
135
See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 37, at 256; Melone, supra note 5, at 68; Gest et al.,
supra note 55; see also MARK GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE (1992) (chronicling rejection
of Bork as judicial appointee because of his subjective rulings); PAUL SIMON, ADVISE AND
CONSENT (1992). Democrats could argue that High Court selection is unique and that they
rarely so assessed lower court nominees. See 143 CONG. REC. S2538-41 (daily ed. Mar. 19,
1997) (statements of Sen. Biden & Sen. Sarbanes).
136
See supra notes 83, 98-101 and accompanying text.
137
North Carolina has a similar situation. Senator John Edwards (D) delayed blocking
Judge Terrence Boyle's Fourth Circuit appointment, until Edwards could discuss with Bush
possible nomination of Judge James Wynn, a Clinton nominee. See Matthew Cooper &
Douglas Waller, Bush's Judicial Picks Could Be a Battle Boyle, nME, May 21, 2001, at 22.
138
See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
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openings and the severe difficulties that those openings create.
The
courts should also develop salutary approaches for facilitating
appointments that the president and senators might implement.
Several concepts I explained earlier pertain to the Sixth Circuit. For
example, Chief Judge Martin claimed that the tribunal functions well
with the present judicial complement but could operate better with a few
140
more positions.
A majority of active circuit judges urged Congress to
141
authorize additional seats.
The court's members positively answered,
in the highest percentages, the Commission survey questions whether
enlarging the circuit would help the tribunal "avoid a backlog" and
142
"write a statement of reasons for all decisions in nonfrivolous appeals."
With all due respect, the small percentage of published opinions which
the Sixth Circuit provides, its relatively slow disposition times, and the
court's substantial reliance on visiting judges suggest that the tribunal
might dispense greater appellate justice or at least work more effectively,
143
were new positions authorized.
Thus, those Sixth Circuit members
who oppose expansion may want to reconsider whether the court would
144
function better using additional judges.
CONCLUSION

Protracted vacancies can erode the delivery of appellate justice. The
difficulty comprises a persistent complication and a current dilemma,
which is in essence political and which public officials could remedy if
they exercised sufficient political will. The Bush Administration and
senators should attempt to expedite and depoliticize appointments.
They might cease or reduce criticism of each other, accommodate

139
This could increase public awareness of, and may galvanize support to ameliorate,
the vacancies problem and perhaps accentuate executive and legislative branch officials
sensitivity to the critical need for expedition.
140
See supra notes 63, 94 and accompanying text; see also supra note 66 and
accompanying text.
141
Some judges did dissent. See Sixth Circuit Analysis, supra note 65; Tobias, supra note
48, at 749 (explaining process for Judicial Conference recommendations of additional
positions).
142
See Working Papers, supra note 83, at 18, 21. The conservative estimates on which
the Judicial Conference bases judgeship proposals suggest the court needs new seats. See
S.1145, 106th Cong. (1999) (proposing two new Sixth Circuit positions); see also Tobias,
supra note 48, at 753. But see Grassley's Report, supra note 61, at 2-7.
143
See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
144
These are disputed, unresolved issues. See supra notes 63-67, 86-97 and
accompanying text. Of course, the authorization of new positions will prove to be an
empty gesture, unless judges can be appointed to the seats.
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partisan disagreements, and ameliorate the existing problem for the
benefit of the courts and the country. The Senate Majority and Minority
Leaders, the Judiciary Committee Chair as well as Attorney General John
Ashcroft and White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales should lead this
endeavor.
Senators who represent each jurisdiction located in the Sixth Circuit
must facilitate cooperation there, among themselves and with President
Bush. The election of the 108th Senate could represent a new beginning
and facilitate greater cooperation between the chamber and the chief
executive. If senators from Sixth Circuit states and the President consult
on the above ideas, they can enhance the federal appeals court
appointments process in these jurisdictions, the Sixth Circuit, and
perhaps the nation.

